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SUMMARY

This article examines the course of tobacco litigation in the
United States and its implicationsfor law andpolicy on both the
national and internationallevels. In our view, the disparate legal
traditions and attitudes of countries outside the United States will
lead the majority of such states to opt for the direct and
transparent regulation of tobacco activities through formal and
perhaps consensual channels. This will likely promote effective
tobacco control without the policy mix encompassing a period of
prolongedlitigation buttressedby settlement and regulation,which
has characterized the U.S. process. Therefore, despite some
increased litigation in the product liability area as a whole, the
approach to tobacco control on the internationallevel is likely to
be characterizedby the continuing, and, indeed, increasedreliance
on direct regulation rather than on ad hoc litigation, the
efficiencies of the former approachhaving now become evident.

*Mr. Bitas is an attorney and practice associate professor of law at the Singapore
Management University. Mr. Barros is a professor of economics at Universidade
Nova de Lisboa and CEPR (London). They benefited from the comments of

Nuno Garoupa and acknowledge the excellent work of Guilherme Vilaga and
Michael S. Navarro, research assistants.
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"People are not disturbed by things,
but by the view they take of them."
-Epictetus, in Manual V

A. INTRODUCTION

Tobacco litigation as it has developed in the United States
and increasingly abroad constitutes an "iconic" example of private,
and in some cases state-supported, litigants using the courts as an
ad hoc policy-making vehicle for mediating between the interests
of an existing but controversial industry and evolving societal
views and priorities. Such litigation has evolved over time in terms
of its scope, magnitude, and sophistication. The intent of this
article is to review the history and evolution of this litigation and to
assess the extent to which it has served the broader public interest
(defined as achieving public health objectives in a decentralized,
but efficient manner).' This paper also assesses whether the U.S.
experience can serve as a guidepost for future approaches to law
and policy on the international level.
The first tobacco case in the United States was filed in
1954, with international developments following some thirty years
later. The first case brought outside of the United States was filed
in Australia in 1986, while Europe followed in 1988 with a case in
Finland. Asia became active in the 1990s, with cases in Japan,
Korea, and the Philippines. More recently, China has seen an
initial case filed against the State Tobacco Monopoly in 2005.
Latin America, particularly Brazil, has also witnessed the
development of substantial tobacco litigation in recent years,
further illustrating the gradual ripple effect of the U.S. litigation
experience internationally. Accordingly, tobacco litigation no
longer can be seen as a strictly U.S. phenomenon.

' Stephen D. Sugarman, The Smoking War and the Role of Tort Law (Apr. 3 1998)
(draft),
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/sugarmans/j gfsm.htm

(evaluating the role of tort law and inquiring as to whether tobacco deserves different
treatment than other product sectors, such as alcohol, automobiles, and medicines).
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The initial domestic case involved an individual smoker
whose wife filed a wrongful death action alleging that her
husband's illness was caused by smoking, a behavior resulting
from the conduct, or rather misconduct, of the industry with regard
to the design, manufacture, and marketing of the product. 2 Over
time, plaintiffs developed a number of standard allegations,
including a failure of tobacco companies to warn of the dangers of
smoking as they relate to its health effects or addictive properties,
and allegations concerning a defective product. Other claims that
have gained increasing currency in recent years are fraud and
misrepresentation. Much has been made of the strategy of the
tobacco companies to contest these cases using all of the resources
at their disposal, despite the fact that cigarettes remain a legal and
highly regulated product.
The tobacco companies have been singularly successful in
defending the vast majority of these cases not only due to their use
(some would say "abuse") of the procedural playing field,3 but also
because judges and juries have looked at the merits of these cases
and have found the notion of "consumer awareness" of the risks of
smoking to be a compelling defense against liability on the part of
the industry.
Awareness issues can relate to both the specific awareness
of the plaintiff in the case or to the general awareness or "common
knowledge" of the members of the ambient social context. 4 Both
2

See Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds, 234 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1956) (where the plaintiff

sought compensation for suffering, pain, and death of her husband, who died of lung
cancer after allegedly relying upon representations in certain newspaper advertisements
and television and radio broadcasts to the effect that "20.000 doctors say that 'Camel'
cigarettes are healthful" and that such cigarettes "are harmless to the respiratory
3system").
This tactic was put into use Michael Jordan, an attorney who successfully defended R.J.
Reynolds ("RJR") in the 1980s. He described the dynamics as follows: "The aggressive

posture we have taken regarding depositions and discovery in general continues to make
these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers... To paraphrase
General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [RJR's] money,
but by making that other son of a bitch spend all his." Graham E. Kelder & Richard A.
Daynard. Tobacco Litigation as a Public Health and Cancer Control Strategy. 51 J. AM.
MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N, 57, 58 (1996).
4 In Continental Europe, the duty of diligence is commonly interpreted in a general,
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types of awareness evidence can be brought to bear with varying
degrees of vigor, depending on the nature of the allegations or the
proposed defense.
Judges and juries have found credence in the "common
knowledge" defense, meaning that as a member of the given
community or society, the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the risks of smoking. Both groups can relate personally to this line
of argument, given their own membership in the community. In
addition, the "common sense" awareness defense serves as an
accessible counterpoint to the more technical aspects of the
medical defense. The persuasive force of this evidence seems to lie
in the general perception that consumers have enough information
to assess accurately the costs and benefits of tobacco consumption.
Despite a history of success in defending these cases, the
industry reached a substantial settlement in 1998 with the state
governments in the United States concerning the alleged
misconduct of the companies and the medical treatment costs
associated with smoking-attributable diseases. 5 These cases and the
related settlement, both of which are described in greater detail
below, constituted a melding of law and policy that should be
factored into tobacco control policies on the international level.
It is fair to ask why the industry found it necessary or
advisable to seek an accommodation when its defense posture,
winning record in the cases and overall legal position were
indicative of a manageable risk. The answer to this question lies in
the impact of certain aspects of the U.S. legal system on the
objective manner rather than a specific. subjective manner. Conduct is compared to that
of the reasonable person placed in similar circumstances and corrected with a
moral/deontological note comprised of the bonus pater familias formula. See Michael
Faure, Economic Analysis of Fault,UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW 311, 316.
5 The Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was signed on November 23, 1998 between

46 states and the four largest tobacco companies. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
Master Settlement Agreement. http://www.rjrt.com/legal/stateMSA.asp (last visited Dec.
7. 2008). In 2004, certain states (e.g., Ohio. Maine, and Massachusetts) sued the tobacco
industry for money owed under the terms of the Agreement. The dispute arose from a
provision allowing the reduction of industry payments for business lost. Business Wire,
U.S. Tobacco Settlement ABS Undaunted as States Pursue Payments (May 2, 2006),
http://findarticles'com/p/articles/mi mOEIN/is /ai n26847106?tag=artBody;coll.

2008

TOBACCO CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF LITIGATION

5

amounts at issue, the nature of the claims, and the ability to bring
these elements together in the form of new liability theories backed
by parties with significant political power and resources. Against a
backdrop of declining social acceptance of smoking and new
studies relating to nicotine and its propensity to cause
"dependence," these developments influenced the industry to act
decisively to curb further litigation.
To summarize, our discussion will initially focus on the
historical evolution of tobacco litigation in the United States
(Section B) as divided into several distinct chronological phases or
"waves." Section C reviews the implications and impact of
evolving tobacco litigation on regulation. Then, in Section D, the
international diffusion of tobacco litigation is presented. A
discussion of the likely evolution of tobacco litigation and its
implications for regulation in countries other than the United States
is set forth in Section E. Finally, Section F provides the concluding
remarks.
B. HISTORY OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE

I. Early Litigation - Core Structure of an Individual Case 1950s/60s
A typical tobacco case, dating back to the first cases in the
1950s, alleges that an individual began smoking at a young age,
ignorant of the attendant health risks, and that subsequently such
individual was unable to quit due to the addictive properties of the
product. These allegations were further buttressed in the late 1980s
and early 1990s by findings of the U.S. Surgeon General and the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, describing nicotine as an
addictive drug. 6 Such allegations are often reinforced by claims of
6

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH

CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING - NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON
GENERAL
(1988),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/

sgr/sgr 1988/index.htm (concluding that nicotine is the drug in tobacco that causes
addiction and that the pharmacologic and behavioral processes caused by it is similar to
drugs such as heroin and cocaine): Letter from David Kessler, Commissioner. FDA, to
the Coalition on Smoking or Health (1995) (stating that the FDA had received "mounting

evidence" that "the nicotine ingredient in cigarettes is a powerfully addictive agent" and
that "cigarette vendors control the levels of nicotine to satisfy this addiction) in Kelder &

v. 16
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fraud

and misrepresentation

regarding

the

conduct

of the

companies and the alleged information asymmetries existing
between the consumers and the industry. The prevailing
information environment, including what consumers knew or could
have known has, however, often served to blunt these claims,
thereby yielding a powerful 7 common sense "awareness" defense
that vitiates such allegations.
As one would expect, tobacco litigation often involves a
number of medical submissions on both sides, with plaintiffs
seeking to meet their burden of proof regarding causation.
Plaintiffs must show that despite their knowledge of the health
risks, the smoking of cigarettes, due to their inherent (defective)
design or the actions of the companies in the marketing of the
products, 8 was the proximate cause of the alleged damage, whether

in the form of the illness or addiction, which in recent years has
been claimed as an injury. The complexity or "multi-factorial"
nature of the diseases at issue often makes the establishment of
medical causation difficult for plaintiffs, leading in many cases to a
so-called battle of the experts. Regardless of the liability theory,
Daynard supra note 3. at 58: accord Heikki T.Hiilamo, Tobacco Control Implications
of the FirstEuropean ProductLiability Suit, 14 TOBACCO
7 The milestone Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (1965), mandated that each packet bear the warning, "Caution: Cigarette
smoking may be hazardous to your health." Such legal innovation proved to be an
important defense for the industry, leading to a doctrine of "preemption" with regard to
certain claims based on a failure to warn. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 505 (1992)(concluding that Parts V and VI that § 5(b) of the 1969 Act pre-empts
certain of petitioner's failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, but does
not pre-empt other such claims or the claims based on express warranty or conspiracy).
Public Health Cigarette Act of 1969. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970), later
removed all tobacco advertising from radio and television.
8 Sugarman, supra note I (giving the opinion that the tort liability threat distorted the
industry's incentives to develop safer cigarettes, as improvements could buttress claims
relating to the defective design of earlier cigarettes and their failure to be "state-of-theart"); see Stephen D. Sugarman, & Agnes Rody Robb. Suing the Tobacco Companies in
the
U.S.
and
Japan,
available
at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/sugarmans/NIHON.htm (discussing the impact of
the consumer by mentioning the failure of such novel designs. like the "Premier"
cigarette, which may have been "safer," but was essentially rejected by consumers for a
number of subjective reasons).
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whether founded on negligence (or negligent failure to warn),
fraudulent misrepresentation, or strict liability regarding the design
of the product, the individual plaintiffs have generally been unable
to meet 9their burden of proof regarding causation, injury, and
damage.
The combination of the "awareness" defense (i.e., that the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the risks), coupled with the
difficulties in proving medical causation, resulted in tobacco
companies winning the vast majority of these cases. Even in regard
to claims based on intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation,
awareness evidence can be used to demonstrate that the plaintiff
did not - or could not - reasonably have relied on the alleged
misrepresentations, knowing them to be false as a matter of
"common knowledge." Similarly, claims based on negligent failure
to warn or design defect have failed due to the companies' ability
to demonstrate that the alleged dangers were known.
II. The Second Wave - Role of Document Production - 1988 to
19941°

After the first wave of litigation in the 1950s and a brief
spike in cases in the mid 1960s following the publication of the
9 See Sugarman & Robb. supra note 8 (reviewing causation and possible bases of liability

for the tobacco industry).

10Marlo Miura, Richard A. Daynard & Jonathan M. Samet, The Role of Litigation in

Tobacco Control, 48 SALUD PUBLICA DE MEXICO 121 121 (2006), available at
http://www.scielosp.org/pdf/spm/v48s1/a15v48s1.pdf. (discussing the forced release of

the industry's internal documents as constituting "one

of the most powerful

consequences of the recent litigation"); Richard A. Daynard. Tobacco Litigation: A Mid
Course Review, 12 CANCER CAUSES & CONTOL 383, 383-4 (2001).
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING & HEALTHY: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964)

available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/Q/ (reaching specific conclusions
concerning the relationship between smoking and health in general); see also ROYAL
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, SMOKING AND HEALTHY (1962) (1962) (reflecting concerns
similar to those set forth in the Surgeon General's Report of 1964); see generally ROYAL
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS & ACTION ON SMoKING & HEALTHY, FORTY FATAL YEARS: A

REVIEW OF THE 40 YEARS SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF THE 1962 REPORT FOR THE ROYAL
COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS (2002), available at http://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/pubs/books/
ash/fortyfatalyears.pdf (discussing the relationship between smoking and "cancer of the
lung" and other diseases).
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1964 Surgeon General's Report, 1 1 tobacco litigation abated until
1988 when the Cipollone case was filed, effectively starting a
second wave of litigation that12 exhibited distinct characteristics
from the earlier group of cases.
In the new wave of litigation, plaintiffs attempted to prove
the historical core allegations through increased reliance on
industry documents produced as a result of discovery, 13 a
procedural device whereby litigants are able to ask for documents
from the other side in order to narrow and focus the issues. Indeed,
document production has taken on epic proportions in the United
States. 14 Some 30 million separate items were produced in the
Minnesota attorney general litigation alone, a case in which the
State of Minnesota sought to recover the amounts expended to treat
"smoking-attributable" illnesses among the treatment populations
5
of certain state-supported health plans.'

IL The Third Wave - Class Actions - 1990s
For the next wave of litigation a new approach began to
take shape using the procedural device of the class action. 16 This
' Cipollone, supra note 7. at 504 (involving a products liability suit against tobacco
companies where for the first time, the jury was allowed to view tobacco companies
internal documents allegedly outlining a strategy to mislead the public about the dangers
of smoking).
12 For example, the earlier cases focused primarily on the fact that smoking in general
was unhealthy and that the Tobacco companies should have made this public knowledge;
the new wave of cases focused on the same hazards, but shifted the burden to the
Tobacco companies to prove that they did not knowingly mislead consumers and allege
that the product was safe when in fact, it was not.
See generally FED R. CIv. P.. 26-37 (concerning depositions and discovery); Miura,
Daynard. & Samet. supra note 10, at 126 (resulting in plaintiffs' attorneys and the health
movements organizing and pooling resources as more cases were filed).
14 Miura, Daynard, & Samet, supra note 10, at 130 (with the Minnesota settlement
securing from the industry a "roadmap" to its internal documents and a ten-year paid
depository for the documents in Minnesota and Great Britain).
15 Id., at 122-124 (on the use of scientific evidence in tobacco litigation); See generally
Stanton A. Glantz et al.,THE CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996) (on creating a massive disclosure
attitude of"secret" documents everywhere).
16See e.g., Engle v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct.
Nov. 6. 2000), rev'd, 853 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that certification of
state-wide class of 700,000 cigarette smokers was not warranted); Castano v. The
American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a multistate class
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procedural innovation was accompanied by the development of
"new" substantive claims, including those relating to non-smokers
exposed to second-hand smoke (or Environmental Tobacco Smoke
(ETS)) and smokers injured in fires caused by cigarettes, both of
which tended to eliminate or deemphasize the role of the plaintiffs'
awareness and volition in causing the alleged damage.
The use of class actions constituted an attempt to garner
increased economic leverage by aggregating claims among
individual smokers based on the assumption that there were
common issues, typical throughout the class, and that adjudication
as a class would therefore further the public policy aims of judicial
economy and efficiency. The class action was an attempt to level
the playing field between the industry and the plaintiffs, though the
scope for misusing this procedural device to seek class status for
frivolous or unsuitable claims has been great, leading most recently
in the United States to the passage of the Class Action FairnessAct
in 2005.1'
No longer was the debate between a lone smoker and a
powerful industry, but a clash between two powerful adversaries:
the industry and a group of aggrieved smokers, whose claims in the
aggregate could reach billions of dollars, including punitive
damages awards authorized by the United States legal system.
Beyond the litigants, the class action mechanism also attracted the
attention of another powerful group: the Plaintiffs' Bar. The

would be decertified because district court failed to consider variation in state law
affecting predominance and superiority), and Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., 641 So.2d 888
(Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (involving an Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) case with
companies settling to pay $300 million to a scientific research foundation to support
federal legislation prohibiting smoking in international flights, among other concessions).
17 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. Class actions face

some natural difficulties in the tobacco area, including: i) the individual nature of the
liability; ii) the cases becoming too large to handle; and iii) questions concerning the
benefit to lawyers or their clients. See generally Richard 0. Faulk. Armageddon through
Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution,
10 MICH. ST. DET. C.L.J. INT'L L. 205 (2001) (discussing the merits and problems of class
actions); see also Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003)
(discussing the benefits and costs of class actions).

v. 16
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growing social disdain for smoking, 18 coupled with the high
awards at issue, rendered the industry an attractive target and
caused plaintiffs' lawyers to redouble their efforts to develop new
and more sophisticated claims to bring a reputedly wayward
industry to heel.
In addition, the contingency fees detailed supra provided a
powerful economic incentive for plaintiffs' lawyers to take and
promote these cases. Certain aspects of the United States legal
system fueled the proliferation of tobacco litigation during the
19
1990s. Among these were the damages awards at issue,
stemming from procedural devices such as class actions for
aggregating claims; the sanctioning by the U.S. legal system of
punitive damages, which could be highly disproportionate to the
compensatory amounts at issue; 21 and the legal practice of taking
cases on a contingent fee 22
basis a practice highly restricted by most
systems.
legal
continental

18 The

social pressure against tobacco benefited from several attempts from the FDA to

regulate nicotine as a drug. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120 (2000) (holding that the FDA had no authority to regulate tobacco). Individual
plaintiffs also turned their attention to the addictive nature of cigarettes by alleging that
while they "chose" to smoke, they were not free to stop. The 29 Surgeon General's
Reports on Smoking and Health published between 1964-2006 were also instrumental in
sustaining this momentum.
19See Matthias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the
Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751
(2003) (for a comparison with the rest of the world regarding product liability awards).
20 In Continental Europe, modern theories of liability generally assume a compensatory
function not a punitive one. This is a point stressed and criticized by the Law and
Economics school. See gernally, DAVID D. FRIEDMAN. LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS
HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 206-211 (2000):
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 243-247 (2004)

STEVEN SHAVELL,

(on the economic

rationale for punitive damages).
21 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. ACHKADE,

& W. KIP

(2002) (general view of the debate
surrounding punitive damages): Thomas A. Eaton, David B. Mustard & Susette M.
Talarico, The Effects of Seeking Punitive Damages on the ProcessingTort Claims. 34 J.
LEGAL STUD. 343, 343-44 (2005) ("Critics maintain that punitive damage awards are
highly unpredictable. with large variations in size, and that juries are ill informed and
poorly equipped to perform rational risk assessment.").
22 See Reimann, supra note 19, at 823 n.385.
VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE
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The confluence of a "socially" unacceptable industry, the
prospects of substantial damages awards, and an active Plaintiffs'
Bar, all underwritten by contingent fee arrangements, spawned a
type of legal "free-for-all" caricatured both at home and abroad in
numerous television programs and movies. To paraphrase John
Grisham, the reality was if not a "runaway jury," a runaway legal
system. Parties disagree as to whether this heightened activity has
promoted the interests of tobacco control, improved the lives of
those bringing the cases, and contributed to a constructive modus
vivendi, or whether it has merely enriched lawyers on both sides
and created a type of Mexican "stand-off' resulting in a
misallocation of both intellectual and financial resources. 23 The
more limited scope and volume of tobacco litigation in
jurisdictions outside of the United States suggest that the favorable
procedural context and related financial incentives were a major
factor in the proliferation of these cases in the United States as
opposed to elsewhere. Moreover, the overall societal welfare
achieved in the United States in terms of resources expended and
efficiencies gained remains questionable.
IV. The Third Wave Continues: Medical Cost Recoupment
Litigation - 1994 and Beyond

In developing new and more sophisticated claims, the
Plaintiffs' Bar sought to leverage the mechanisms for aggregating
claims and to blunt the effect of "awareness" evidence, which
convinced both judges and juries that individuals were responsible
for their own situations when duly aware of the risks of a given
behavior. The class action mechanism had achieved the
aggregation of damages amounts, but still left plaintiffs vulnerable
to arguments that smoking behavior and disease were largely
individualized inquiries. As a result, the federal courts in the
23

See Daynard & Kelder. supra note 3, at 57; Miura. Daynard & Samet. supra note 10

(both reviewing the 50- year history of U.S. tobacco litigation from a public health.
advocacy perspective, portraying litigation as a valid and important strategy for tobacco
control and expressing enthusiasm about the efficacy and prospects of success for the
"third wave" of litigation).
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United States have not certified the majority of class actions.
Instead they continue to be viewed as individualized claims that
fail to meet the criteria of commonality, typicality, and
predominance regarding the issues at hand, and as a result fail to
further the broader goals of judicial economy and efficiency.
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
class certification depends on the satisfaction of the criteria of
numerosity, typicality, and commonality. The named plaintiffs
must also demonstrate that they can adequately represent the class.
For mass tort actions claiming monetary damages, plaintiffs must
further demonstrate that the common issues "predominate" and
that the class action mechanism is superior to other forms of
dispute resolution in terms of efficiency and judicial economy.24
The extent to which these last two criteria are fulfilled falls within
the purview of judicial discretion; the individualized nature of
smoking behavior, lifestyles, and disease, have, in the view of most
25
federal courts, rendered these cases unsuitable for certification.
The state courts have been somewhat more accommodating
in certifying these cases, with the Engle case in Florida being the
most notable example. 26 However, even a certified class becomes
subject at a later stage to a series of mini-trials, where questions
concerning the nature of each claimant's disease, behavior,
individual level of awareness, and resulting responsibility are
examined. Accordingly, while the class action mechanism afforded
a degree of leverage by creating blocks of claimants and high
24

"A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if...
(3) the courtfinds

that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominateover
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (2008) (emphasis added).
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998) (suggesting the
25

introduction of a Cigarette Card to make proof and trial development issues easier and to
allow easier certification of such actions; smokers would register with the government
thus making possible aggregations less complicated).
26 See Class Representation Amended Class Action Complaint for Compensatory
and
Punitive Damages, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Case No. 94-08273 CA 22, 2001
WL 34133821 (Fla. 11 th Cir. Ct. May 7, 2001) was filed on May 5, 1994. This was the
first smokers' class action suit filed to reach trial in U.S. history.
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damages amounts, it failed to obviate the persuasive defenses
developed to dissect the nature of an individual's claim and
personal responsibility in respect thereof.
Given the lack of success of this approach, a new strategy
emerged: asking for medical cost recoupment. Medical cost
recoupment cases offered the prospect of high damages amounts,
the active involvement of the state as a political support to the
plaintiffs' bar, and a potentially viable means of blunting the effect
of the defense's individualized evidence, whether based on
awareness or personal medical history.
Stated succinctly, medical cost recoupment litigation takes
a treatment population, such as a state-supported medical program,
and, through statistics, ascribes a portion of disease and related
treatment costs to the use of tobacco, the so-called "smoking
attributable fraction." 27 It is no longer the smoker who brings the
claim, but rather a third-party payor, such as an insurance
company. As such, the notion of individual awareness is relegated
to a secondary level. The state, or in some cases the managers of
the health plan, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, simply claim that
they are being left with a bill, or excess costs, 28 for which they are
not responsible as a result of their own conduct. In so doing, they
assert that individual awareness is not relevant to their claim, to the
extent that their claim is separate and distinct from the
individualized conduct of the treatment population. This makes
this wave quite distinct from the first and second wave of litigation
cases.
27 Miura,
28

Daynard. & Samet. supra note 10, at 124.
See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 5 (challenging the argument by advancing the idea that

smokers "more than pay their way"); see e.g., Robert S. Goldfarb, Thomas C. Leonard &
Steven M. Suranovic, Are rival theories of smoking underdetermined?, 8 J.ECON.
METHODOLOGY

229 (2001); W. Kip Viscusi,

Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking 29-33 (Nat'l Bureau of

Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4891. 1994) (calling attention to the states "creative"
calculation of medical costs): contra, Nancy Warring, Hanson and Viscusi Dispute
the True Cost of Smoking. HARV. LAW BULL.., Summer 1998. available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/backissues/ summer98/article9.html (pointing

out the intrinsic limits of cost/benefit analysis in certain issues).
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Medical cost recoupment cases introduced another crucial
change. The initiative for bringing the case is with a third party
health care payor, possessing enhanced political power. There was
an implicit assumption that the marginal costs of individual
behavior, whether in terms of tobacco consumption, health care
utilization, and other similar lifestyle choices could somehow be
"homogenized" into a broad statistical model. This failure to
segment individuals to evaluate their behavior as economic actors
was inconsistent with the traditional approach to these questions
from both an economic and litigation perspective. It did, however,
provide a powerful means for taking the focus off of both the
individual and the state in terms of the "prophylactic" steps that
could have been taken, whether through individual choices or
prevention programs, and thereby blunted the effectiveness of the
individualized defenses that had played a large part in company
defense strategies up to that time. The manner in which the cases
were brought and the ultimate settlement essentially constituted a
cost shifting from health plans to the companies. 29 This was a
profound development with significant implications for the policy
making process and the overall balance between regulation and
litigation.
Without wishing to be overly legalistic, the defense has
countered that the claims are derivative of those of the individuals
in the treatment population. As such, the state or medical fund
must proceed in subrogation, or on a case-by-case basis, as an
insurer and the defense should be entitled to all of the defenses it
would have in any individual case. In such cases there is no
"direct" action, to the extent that the damages claimed by the
29

See Daynard & Kelder, supra note 3 at 57 (arguing that third wave cases "could shift

billions of dollars of health and productivity costs from families and third-party payers to
cigarette companies, forcing increases in cigarette prices and consequent large drops in
consumption, especially among children and teenagers;" though contending that this is an
inefficient shift); Daniel Givelber. Cigarette Law, 73 INDIANA L.J. 867. 867-69 (1998)
(claiming "one might assume that what the states are asking for is precisely what the
progenitors of strict products liability envisioned: enterprise liability for the
manufacturers of an inherently dangerous product." in reality, this shift to the companies
means no more than obliging them to "fully" internalize the social costs of tobacco sale);
contra Sugarman & Robb, supra note 8, at 4-6.
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medical program are too remote and derivative of those of the
individual members of the treatment population. The exclusive
remedy therefore lay in subrogation. This line of defense was wellfounded in the body of domestic tort law at the time that the first
cost recoupment case was brought in Mississippi in 1994. This
case was later followed by some 49 other state cases. 30 Given the
emerging legal doctrine, some states, including Florida, 3 1 passed
legislation that allowed such cases to go forward by providing for a
statutorily created "direct" action on the part of the state and
denying the companies the right to raise individualized defenses.
The powerful mix of social and political forces provided an
almost irresistible momentum for the states and the industry to
seek an accommodation. With huge damages awards at issue and
the state bureaucracies mobilized against the industry, the
downside risk of a series of cascading billion dollar judgments
constituted a risk that the industry could not afford to take.
Negotiations with members of the Clinton White House began
with a view towards seeking a global accommodation that would
resolve the existing litigation and provide a set of ground rules32and
safeguards going forward to be ratified by an Act of Congress.
The nature of the political process, together with the
industry's "sultry" reputation conspired, however, to torpedo these
30 Mississippi

was the first state to sue tobacco companies in 1994. In re Mike Moore ex

rel. State of Mississippi Tobacco Litigation, Cause No. 94-1429, 2006 WL 3804253

(Miss. Ch. May 30, 2006).The case was settled in 1997 and one year later three other
settlements were reached with Florida, Texas, and Minnesota, generating a payment from
the industry of $35.3 billion for a period of 25 years. among many other obligations.
These individual state settlements were followed by the MSA, covering the outstanding
recoupment claims of the remaining 46 states. See The Government and the Courts
Suing the Tobacco Companies. http://www.libraryindex.com/pages/2134/GovernmentCourts-SUING-TOBACCO-COMPANIES.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
31 See Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, Fla. Stat. § 409.910 (Supp. 1994).
See Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, The Tobacco Deal, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 323, 334.
32 THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEEMENT AND LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL:
AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TOPICS AND PROVISIONS OF THE MULTISTATE MASTER
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 23, 1998 (Graham. Kelder & Patricia Davidson.

eds., 1999) available at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/tobacco-control/resources/msa/
msa analysis.pdf.
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negotiations. The scope and nature of the historical allegations

lodged against the industry caused Congress to up the proverbial
ante until such time as the industry could no longer pursue the
negotiations at that level. These discussions were eventually
replaced by a direct dialogue with the states resulting in a more
limited accord, the Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA") of
1998, whereby the industry agreed to pay $206 billion to the states
over a twenty-five year period and to curb certain marketing
33
practices in exchange for the dropping of all similar claims.
The MSA provided less sweeping protections (e.g., no
formal cap on punitive damages in tobacco cases), but that had the
virtue of being self-contained, manageable, and conducive to
immediate implementation. 34 Subsequently, medical cost
recoupment cases brought by private health funds, as opposed to
the states, have repeatedly failed on the grounds that there is no
cause of action. Denied the political lever of state support and
various forms of enabling legislation, plaintiffs have been
unsuccessful as judges have begun to reassert and apply traditional
legal doctrine to assess and dispose of these cases.
The MSA can be highlighted then as a consequence to a
large extent of government power and the risks it posed to
industry, rather than a result of clear-cut legal grounds alone.
Without government power on the other side, the tobacco industry
probably would have recovered the upper hand in litigation.
V. Other Developments - The Federal and "Lights" Cases
Despite the movement toward a new equilibrium between
governmental authorities and the industry, culminating with the
MSA and the dialogue it promoted, throwbacks to an earlier period
of managing the tobacco industry through litigation persist. The
33 The MSA targeted tobacco advertising/sponsorship/merchandising

and included
specific provisions to regulate and curb youth access and restrict lobbying. It also created
a National Foundation to study and develop programs on youth use and abuse of tobacco
and to support educational programs to prevent diseases associated with tobacco product
use. Id. (giving a more detailed analysis of the MSA).
34See Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 31, (making an exhaustive critical review of the
MSA).
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federal government, which was not a party to the MSA, brought a
separate case against the industry filed on September 22, 1999 in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This
case included claims for medical cost recoupment, fraud and
misrepresentation,
and racketeering, buttressed by the
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, known as
RICO, a statute originally conceived to break up the criminal
enterprises of organized crime. 35 The medical cost recoupment
claims of the federal government's case have since been rejected,
with only the RICO claims having survived.36 Subsequently, these
claims have been "defanged" pursuant to a ruling issued by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on February 4,
2005, holding that the RICO statute does not support claims for
"disgorgement," the government having claimed that the industry
should "disgorge" its past profits in the amount of $290 billion.
This decision was allowed to stand by the United States Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari on October 17, 2005.
On August 17, 2006, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, with regard to the remaining allegations,
found that the defendant companies had been guilty of racketeering
under the terms of the RICO statute. The Court further ruled,
however, that RICO, as written, did not support a claim for
monetary damages or for other similar monetary remedies (e.g.,
compulsory financing by the companies of education programs),
particularly in light of the previous ruling on "disgorgement." The
government's victory was therefore seen as pyrrhic, although
public health advocates have stressed its significance:
The importance of today's decision will be
minimized by the racketeering defendants, but the
historic finding and remedies imposed by the Court
will 1) forever brand the cigarette companies as
racketeers; 2) energize trial attorneys and provide a
powerful set of documentary and testimonial
35Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
36

See Miura, Daynard & Samet, supra note 10, at 130.
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evidence and findings of fact to bolster cigarette
litigation; 3) undermine the credibility of the
companies as they try to push into emerging
markets around the world; and 4) serve as a
powerful antidote to cigarette company attempts to
portray 37themselves as responsible corporate
citizens.
The disposition of the Federal case suggests the courts have
seen fit to allow these issues to migrate toward the legislative
arena. However, there has been a recent move toward formulating
a new type of case involving "light" cigarettes. These cases allege
that the development of "light" cigarettes constituted a cynical
strategy on the part of the industry to maintain the stock of
smokers by promoting a "safer" cigarette, which was in reality just
as harmful, if not more so, than existing products.
While certain individual cases involve "lights" issues, the
allegations are, for the most part, predicated on consumer fraud.
These involve claims among broad classes of consumers who
allege that during a given number of years they purchased the
product under false pretenses. These claims are formulated in
terms of pure economic loss on the part of asymptomatic smokers
who are claiming a refund in the event that the "light" cigarettes
38
purchased did not provide a reduced level of harmfulness.
Class actions in this area are subject to the hurdles
mentioned previously and have therefore met with uneven success
in terms of certification. One notable case, Price v. Philip Morris
et al, decided in March 2003 by a judge in Madison County,
37 U.S. Cigarette Companies Liable for Violating Federal Anti-Racketeering Statute:

Backgrounder
and
Commentary
(August
17,
2006),
available
http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/litigation/ cases/DOJ/kessler decision 0806.htm.

at

These cases were propelled by recent evidence or findings presented by several
institutions, such as the U.S. National Research Council, the International Agency for
Research on Cancer of the World Health Organization, the U.S. National Cancer
Institute, and tThe U.S. Surgeon General: . Miura. Daynard, & Samet. supra note 10, at
38

1293; . Reimann, supra note 19, at 786 (explaining that pProduct liability does not

generally allow actions for redressing pure economic loss, thus plaintiffs must turn to
general private law.).
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Illinois, yielded a multibillion verdict involving both compensatory
and punitive damages. The judgment has since been overturned by
the Illinois Supreme Court in a judgment rendered on December
15, 2005.39 Plaintiffs' motion for a rehearing was denied in a ruling
rendered by the same court on May 6, 2006 and the United States
Supreme Court has since declined to review the case.
The "lights" cases reveal an evolving trend in tobacco
litigation toward the use of novel legal theories as a basis for
recovery for past industry behavior. Such an approach is open to
question as the development and marketing of these products was
undertaken with the medical community. It now centers on the
manner in which "light" cigarettes were developed and whether the
industry applied best practices with regard to their design,
manufacture, and marketing. As the authorities and the industry
move toward a greater degree of partnership in managing the
externalities associated with cigarettes, these cases could play a
useful role in an increasingly constructive dialogue between
government and industry about how best to manage a "product that
everybody loves to hate." 40 Whether an evolution from litigation in

court to settlement agreements will eventually emerge is still too
early to say.
C. ECONOMIC AND REGULATORY OUTCOMES
OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE

L Law and Economics
The United States experience concerning recoupment
litigation has set the stage for international tobacco litigation and
offers lessons to the international arena. Medical cost recoupment
39 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that the Federal Trade Commission explicitly

authorized the company to use descriptors such as "lights" and "low-tar." As such, Philip
Morris could not be held liable for the use of those terms under section 10b (1) of the

Illinois Consumer Fraud Act or under the Illinois Deceptive Practices Act. See Price v.
Philip Morris, Inc.. 848 N.E.2d 1 1, 54 (111. 2005).
40 Schwab v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc.. 449 F.Supp.2d 992. 1121-1132 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(certifying a national class of "lights" smokers by alleging fraud and conspiracy under the
RICO statute which suggests that the "lights" cases retain a certain level of political and
legal vitality).
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litigation, particularly as framed by the states, marked a concerted
attempt to transform the underlying dispute into one centered on
economic damage (i.e., aggregate economic costs to the third party
health payor rather than "specific" payments for individualized,
personal injury). The third party payors were claiming what was, in
their view, pure economic loss, albeit one that was "derivative" of
an underlying personal injury (i.e., the costs associated with the
diseased population). This approach led to a reliance on statistical
aggregates rather than individualized proof. It often resulted in a
particular reliance on epidemiological data and, to some extent,
reflected a collapsing of public health policy issues into an
adjudicative setting.
Population attributable risk calculations, which underlie
many of the damages calculations, sought to take epidemiological
data, combined with smoking prevalence data, to generate a
coefficient that could be applied against a "basket" of treatment
costs to arrive at a damages amount. 41 While such figures could
yield a broad measure of an estimated cost of smoking, they could
not estimate the cost of conduct, or, in the plaintiffs' view, alleged
misconduct of the companies. 42 The latter was the crux of
plaintiffs' legal argument that through bad acts (i.e., misleading
advertising, etc.) the industry had created excess smoking, which
had in turn resulted in excess disease and associated medical costs.
This conduct element was absent in plaintiffs' early modeling
exercises, but they later sought to address it, albeit unpersuasively.
In particular, since the health plans affect the behavior of
the beneficiaries in a potentially relevant way, the decisions to
initiate, quit, or continue smoking cannot be traced solely to

41 Such

computations are based on regularities across the population and therefore do not

take into account a particular individual or situation.
42 See Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 31, at 39383. ("If the litigation against the
companies were focused on truth seeking and a fair calculation of damages. then we
would be less enthusiastic about legal protections. But none of the parties seems
particularly concerned about relating payments to damages. That is why the up-front
damage payments were based on how deep each company's pockets wereas and not on its
contribution to disease.").
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company activities. 43 Comparisons to reveal the effect of company
conduct on consumption, and by extension disease and cost, could
include smoking rates of individuals in environments with different
levels of advertising and a certain level of insurance as well as
between individuals with and without insurance, given a constant
level of advertising. Even this analysis, however, fails to
distinguish between "company conduct" and "company
misconduct," another potentially relevant aspect of plaintiffs' legal
argumentation and related damages calculations.
The main methodological problems with this approach lie
in the identification of a clear control group. To trace clearly the
effects of 'misconduct,' it is necessary to identify observable
decisions or consequences that arise under 'misconduct' but not
under 'proper conduct,' the mere act of selling cigarettes as a duly
authorized, legal activity. To the extent that smokers' illnesses can
develop under either form of 'conduct' on the part of the
companies, the mere onset of illness is insufficient to distinguish
one case from the other. Plaintiffs' usual approach implied that
assessing the likelihood of developing an illness was a proxy for
company misconduct, but it is unclear how to interpret the
available information in order to isolate "unambiguous"
misconduct of firms and the effect thereof from authorized
commercial behavior. In short, plaintiffs' aggregate damages
theories masked the microeconomic analysis of consumer behavior
and the contribution of company behavior (alleged misconduct)
that would normally have been required to establish a colorable
claim.
With regard to the estimates themselves, plaintiffs offered
numbers considered only as ranges to prove the precise magnitude
of damage. It is here that one sees the potential nexus between
public health policy and the adjudicative process. Estimates that
4'' Goldfarb.

Robert, Leonard & Suranovic, supra note 28, at 232-33 (summarizing
rational/non-rational smoking theories that reflect the complexity of calculations and
models and focus on smoker behavior rather than company conduct): see also Gary S.
Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON 675

(1988).
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could have been used to formulate broad tax and regulatory
strategies were offered as measures of damage between litigants.
Expert submissions from the defense often highlighted this point,
signaling the misuse of these statistical tools and constructs for the
designated purposes, but allowing that they could be useful in
other contexts, such as the public policy forum.
As the disputes with the states shifted from the courtroom
to the negotiating arena, these broad measures of alleged damage
became more appropriate benchmarks for discussion. They set the
stage for the implementation of a new modus vivendi between the
states and the industry, incorporating the settlement of the
outstanding claims, while at the same time setting rules concerning
marketing and future reporting requirements concerning
consumption, particularly among juveniles. Within this broader
policy context, the disputes between the states and the industry had
turned into an argument about the cost of doing business and the
appropriate level of the associated tax.
Today the MSA lays out the ground rules between the
companies and the states as to future compensation and required
conduct. While the implementation of this agreement is monitored
through formal channels, one wonders whether this type of a
negotiated accord provides the level of procedural transparency
and predictability that a similar piece of legislation might have
offered, particularly given the twenty-five year time horizon.
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II. The Interplay of Litigation and Regulation -- The
Rulemaking Process 44
In the recoupment cases, litigation was essentially used to
promote "consensual rulemaking," albeit with a coercive element,
namely the threat of multi-billion dollar judgments supplemented
by punitive damages. In settling these cases, the states took a
realistic view of the role of tobacco in society, recognizing its role
as a highly flexible source of budgetary revenue and
acknowledging that a substantial percentage of the population will
choose to smoke irrespective of the marketing activities undertaken
by the companies. The accommodation reached in the MSA
amounted to an "atonement" by the industry for past activities
viewed through a modern-day lens concerning appropriate
standards of corporate morality and, more importantly, established
a compact for managing a popular yet hazardous product. It
acknowledged the economic dislocation that would be caused by
"emasculating" an industry overnight, with the attendant
implications for employment and the reallocation of industrial
capacity. In short, the MSA constituted the melding of law and
politics with the "art of the possible" to manage evolving economic
and social realities.
Assuming that the states sought to act in a benevolent
manner to address a pressing public health problem, 45 it is worth
44 This interplay has been widely discussed under the title of "Regulation through

Litigation" as it relates to risky products and products liability where regulatory
standards have fallen short. The issue is whether litigation is needed to pursue
regulation. See Doug Bandow. Litigative vs. Legislative Democracy. THE CATO
INSTITUTE (March 20. 2000). available at http://www.cato.org/pub display.php?

pubid 4752 (noting the inefficiency of litigation, stressing that political regulatory
silence remains a valid posture that should be respected and not necessarily
interpreted as a political failure); contra generally Wendy Wagner, When All Else
Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO L.J. 693 (2007)

arguing that jurors and courts are institutions that provide a necessary avenue for
intervention). The Illinois Supreme Court ruling in Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co, 835 N.E. 2d 801 (111. 2005) has been interpreted as a blow against the

regulation through litigation movement.
4' Anti-smoking groups advocate the prohibition of tobacco sale as a solution. This
approach would probably be effective but would raise certain problems, namely the
creation of a black market and problems of a "paternalistic" nature.
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examining both their rationale and approach. The justification for
government intervention of this type usually results from some
form of market failure regarding the inefficient dissemination of
information and the management of the resulting externalities
46
(costs) to society. The typical policy response to such a situation
would be to raise prices through
a tax increase to cover the
47
externality.
the
of
cost
estimated
In the present situation, the states increased the cost of the
product on the front-end via litigation and then imposed a tax on
the back-end through the settlement. 4 8 From the range of policy
instruments that were at the disposal of the states, it would appear
that they opted for the lever that was most politically and/or
socially acceptable (i.e., suing the companies) but perhaps least
efficient in terms of the overall cost of implementation and
associated transaction costs. 49 A contrary view holds that the
political leverage of the companies in the various state legislatures
rendered the judicial route the best and, in some respects, the only
means for effecting far-reaching "regulatory" change in the
industry.50 Accordingly, there is a nexus between regulation and
litigation with the appropriate balance lying, to some extent, in the
eye of the proverbial beholder.

In an important paper by J. Bulow and P. Klemperer
46

Goldfarb, Leonard, & Suranovic, supra note 28. at 237 (discussing the efficient

dissemination of information); Viscusi, supra note 28. at 33 (enumerating savings arising
from the shorter life expectancy of smokers);. contra Hanson & Logue, supra note 25, at
1185-1223; Warring, supra note 28 (identifying two main market failures: i) if smokers
were fully informed of the smoking risks/companies' misconduct they would
change/have changed their decisions and ii) there is an externalization of part of the
smoking social costs to the smokers' insurers: which justify imposition of liability on the
tobacco companies).
47 Viscusi, supra note 28, at 2-3 (for a presentation of possible justifications for the use of
taxes).
48 Id. at 9-11: Sugarman, supra note 1 (nothing that this illegitimate "tax windfall" may
produce a consequence --- an open season against all risky products).
49 Viscusi, supranote 28 at 29-33.
50 Contra Wagner, supra note 44, at 694-695 (claiming a political process failure with
regards to risky products with the Courts becoming a "supplemental institutional
mechanism for making products safer" rather than an "illegitimate end-run around the
political process" as most leading scholars believe).
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entitled "The Tobacco Deal," the authors contend that the crucial
trade-off for the companies as set forth in the MSA was between
liability protection and increases in cigarette taxes.51 While taxes
were undesirable, the companies were able to use the agreement as
a coordination device, to set prices closer to the monopoly level. In
so doing, the recoupment litigation, and specifically the MSA,
recognized the reality of industry concentration and pricing power
while using the same to impose a heightened control over industry
activities, such as advertising. These were far-reaching
compromises and2 trade-offs to be reached through litigation rather
than regulation.5
D.

STRATEGIC AND ANALYTICAL

CONSIDERATIONS OF THE

U.S.

EXPERIENCE

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

As one considers the growing activism on the international
53
level with regard to both tobacco control and litigation activity,
the following questions can be posed:
(a) To what extent must, or should, the U.S. experience
be replicated on the international level to bring
tobacco/cigarettes, 54 a product with obvious
5' Bulow & Klemperer. supra note 31. at 33810 ("The central trade-off was that the

companies would accepting an increase in cigarette taxes in return for liability
protections,").
52 Contra Bandow, supra note 46 (arguing against the use of litigation
to establish
policy); Wagner, supra note 44, at 695.
5' David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Why Do Europeans Smoke More Than
Americans? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,at'l Working Paper No.12124. 2006)
(Bureau of Econ. Research. Working Paper No. 12124. 2006) (speculating that tobacco
litigation may prove useful in raising the consciousness of the dangers of smoking.
thereby yielding a social benefit from litigation to the extent that the dissemination of
such information could not be achieved through consensual bargaining). See POSNER,
supra note 17, at 383-385 (discussing the social benefits of litigation).
54 The U.S. experience regarding tobacco litigation may also inform the debate
concerning other public health issues, such as obesity and alcohol. See. e.g.. The Public's
Health and the Law in the 21' Century. Fifth Annual Partnership Conference, June 12-14,
2006, available at http://www2.cdc.gov/phlp/conferencecd2006/overview.: see also Amy
N. Fairweather & James F. Mosher, Implications of Tobacco Litigation for Alcohol
Policy, Paper delivered at the 131st Annual Meeting of the American Public Health
Association (November 17, 2003) available at www.cslep.org/publications/APHA2003
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externalities but substantial natural demand, into
conformity with current societal norms?
(b) Does the U.S. litigation experience and the evolving
social, economic, and commercial equilibrium
arising therefrom offer a platform for addressing the
"tobacco issue" internationally in a more forthright
and economically efficient manner than has been
the case in the United States?
(c) Do evolving standards of corporate responsibility,
increasing globalization, and the tobacco industry's
desire to project unified messages and to apply
consistent behavioral norms offer opportunities for
transparent regulatory action in which litigation
would be one of many levers, but not necessarily
the preferred one, given its inherent inefficiency?
In examining these questions, juxtaposing the U.S.
litigation experience against the evolving international legal
environment provides insights concerning opportunities for
managing what is universally acknowledged as a significant public
health problem. 55 This is particularly helpful given the range of
economic interests of seminal national importance at issue,

AlcoholLitigationpaper.pdf
51 See generally U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, The Health Consequences
of
Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke: A Report of the Surgeon General, at i (2006).
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/secondhandsmoke/report/fullreport.pdf
("[T]his
twenty-ninth report... documents the serious and deadly health effects of involuntary
exposure to tobacco smoke."); World Health Organization, World Health Organization,
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control I (2reprint 2005003), available at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/ frameworkl/WHO FCTC english.pdf (recognizing in
Preamble "that "[T]the spread of the tobacco epidemic is a global problem with serious
consequences for public health that calls for the widest possible international
cooperation...."); Benjamin Mason Meier. BreathingLife into the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control: Smoking Cessation and the Right to Health, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 137, 137-41 (2005) (noting the direct mal-effects of smoking, of
secondhand smoke, and of tobacco production, and emphasizing that "[lt]his threat to
global health.., cannot consciously be ignored").
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including budgetary 56flexibility, employment, and the allocation of
productive capacity.
Tobacco litigation has spread to diverse parts of the world,
albeit with less scope and intensity than in the United States. The
preoccupation of international institutions with tobacco control
issues and related policies has however become a hallmark of the
world stage. Since 1980, the European Union has enacted more
than twenty instruments addressing the tobacco question, including
directives, decisions, resolutions, and recommendations.
A careful reading of such documents reveals the
preoccupation of the EU with balancing regulatory policy
concerning public health with the values and functioning of a free
market economy. Such concerns are manifested in the key legal
texts, where the first reference/first legal basis advanced is linked
to the protection of the common market and the associated free
flow of goods. This point is clearly set forth in Directive
2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
June 5, 2001, wherein Article 130 provides that the consumption,
sale, and importation of tobacco products in conformity with this
Directive cannot be forbidden or restricted .
Tobacco control policies and measures implemented on the
56

See Gijsbert van Liemt. The World Tobacco Industry: Trends and Prospects 21-22, 25.

29 (Int'l Labour Office
Working Paper No.
179, 2002), available
http://www.ilooit.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/tobacco/wp179.pdf

at

(explaining the economic dependence of certain sectors of the population on the tobacco
industry).
57 The expansive coverage of such regulatory instruments includes the following issues: i)

youth smoking: ii) workplace protection: iii) the protection of non-smokers in general iv)
tobacco and product specifications. including tar, nicotine, and associated ISO
(International Standards Organization) measurement methods v) labeling, promotion.
sponsorship, publicity; and vi) environment and sensitive spaces). These instruments are

particularly useful in that they (1) raise a legitimate question as to the necessity of using
litigation as a gap-filling technique to supplement regulatory policy, and) (2) examine
whether other similar justifications exist to support the efficiency of litigation in this

sphere. This point is clearly set forth in Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 5. June 2001, wherein Article 130 (providing that the consumption,

sale, and importation of tobacco products in conformity with this Directive cannot be
forbidden or restricted). See W. Kip Viscusi. Regulation of Health, Safety and
Environmental Risks 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11934,
2006), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/wi 1934.
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international level have therefore sought to balance public health
objectives with economic considerations. An examination of the
interplay of law and economics in the U.S. litigation context,
particularly in terms of the scope and evolution of the cases
brought, and the impact thereof on the current commercial,
economic, and regulatory modus vivendi can aid policymakers in
assessing the implications of this regulatory dynamic.
When considering the possible international implications of
U.S. tobacco control, one needs to acknowledge the specific
conditions of the legal system of the home country. The United
States has a unique approach to litigation, particularly as it relates
to mass torts and product liability claims. The courts have been
propelled to the center of the debate, with litigants seeking to
vindicate their rights before judges vested with great discretion
over the scope and progress of the proceedings and lay juries
capable of meting out substantial monetary awards. This primacy
of the judicial system in arbitrating among the various societal
stakeholders might or might not be consistent with systems that
have adopted a more regulatory and administrative approach to
managing issues of broad societal
significance, such as those in
58
Europe, and to some extent Asia.
E. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE

L History of the InternationalExperience
A detailed analysis of the international experience is
beyond the scope of this article, 59 but a few analytical and strategic
points can be made. As tobacco litigation reached its second wave
in the United States with the Cipollone case of 1988 and the use of
58
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extensive document production, it was just beginning
internationally. The first case was filed in Australia in 1986 and
then in Europe in 1988. The Aho litigation in Finland 60 involved an
individual smoker and incorporated a number of the standard
allegations. Since then, diverse forms of litigation have proliferated
internationally. Individual cases, class actions, recoupment cases,
and, most recently, "lights" cases, have all been filed in Israel,
while Spain and France have seen both individual cases and
recoupment actions.
The relative absence of contingent fee arrangements, the
generally lower amount of damages awards 6 1 (Israel constitutes an
exception),62 the limited existence of class action statutes, and the
existence of a professional judiciary as opposed to a jury system,
have all served to contain the scope and magnitude of tobacco
litigation outside the United States. Developments are not static
however. Class action proposals have been formally adopted in
Sweden and proposed in both Finland and France. "Lights"
litigation is developing in Italy, alleging the deceptive nature of the
term "lights" prior to the prohibition of its use on cigarette
packaging as mandated by the EU Directive 2001/37/EC.
In a manner broadly similar to the experience in the United
States prior to the MSA, the industry continues to have significant
success in defending these cases from both a procedural and
substantive perspective. As cases similar to those filed in the U.S.
decades earlier are brought in Europe and elsewhere, firms have
been able to leverage their U.S. courtroom experience and related
litigation strategies. The critical issue going forward will be the
extent to which the U.S. experience will be replicated before a
realistic societal modus vivendi can be reached. That is, to what
extent will the experience abroad reflect a prolonged and intensive
60
61

Cipollone, supra note 7.
See Tobacco Lawsuits Outside the U.S.. http://www.philipmorrisinternational.com/

PMINTL/pages/eng/busenv/Int litigation.asp (last visited Nov. 24. 2008).
62 This is the case between Pentti Aho and the companies Oy Rettig Ab and Suomen
Tupakka

British American Tobacco Nordic which the Finnish Supreme Court

ultimately dismissed the case in 2001 after years of wrangling. See Hiilamo, supra note 6,
at 22-24.

v. 16

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

period of litigation involving successive waves of individual cases,
class actions, and, finally, medical cost recoupment cases brought
by national health services, sickness funds or large heath plans
possessing significant political leverage?
Much is made of industry attempts to penetrate the markets
of the developing world in order to expand markets and secure
market share. In pursuing these objectives, the tobacco industry is
increasingly sensitive to both the public relations and real costs of
the U.S. experience just as companies in other industry sectors,
such as Microsoft, have factored their U.S. experience into their
approach abroad. Therefore, if faced with litigation against
politically backed agents, at the light of U.S. experience, one may
expect firms will actually look for some sort of settlement. If this
perception has some element of truth and it becomes perceived by
national health services and sickness funds, such legal actions may
become self-fulfilling prophecies.
II. Systemic Considerations
As nations outside the United States evaluate the best
manner of addressing the "tobacco issue" from a public health and
societal perspective, 63 they should take the existing systemic
balance into consideration.
As has been outlined above, the United States is uniquely
hospitable to litigation. Given the relative aversion to centralized,
regulatory solutions, litigation is seen as a valid and important
means of arbitrating among diverse and often divergent societal
interests. Accordingly, mass tort litigation and the procedural
devices necessary to prosecute it (i.e., document discovery, class
actions, and contingent fees) have developed into pillars of the
system. Within this matrix, the judge is vested with great discretion
to ensure that such devices are used in a consistent manner. Such
63The
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control over the process can be far-reaching, casting the judge in
the role of gatekeeper. For instance, it is the judge who decides
whether the requirements for class certification in mass tort cases
claiming monetary damages have been met. This is a wide grant of
authority but one consistent with a system in which litigation has
gained currency as a recognized means for vindicating collective
rights.
The primacy of litigation in the U.S. system as a substitute
for, or supplement to, regulation may also explain the melding of
the two as reflected in the MSA. Within the U.S. system, litigation
can assume a "gap-filling" role, 64 the contours of which can vary
depending on the industry at issue. The recognition of the growing
encroachment of litigation on the regulatory field resulted in the
passage in February 2005 of the Class Action Fairness Act, a law
designed to channel class actions to the federal courts where
certification can be more difficult to secure than in the parallel
state system.
In contrast to the U.S. system, which is often described as
case-specific and litigation-driven, continental legal systems and
those derived there from tend to be more regulatory and
administrative in nature. 65 With regard to tobacco control policies,
this is reflected in consistently high levels of excise taxes 66 and the
use of advertising bans in countries, such as Norway, Finland, and
Sweden dating back to the 1960s. More recent bans have been
introduced in Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Issues of broad
64
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societal significance are shifted to the regulatory sphere with
litigation being left to address individualized disputes.
Within this matrix, code-based legal systems establish the
judge as the agent of the legislature. His or her role is to apply the
code without recourse to discretion or to do so using far less
discretion than that exercised by U.S. counterparts. The question
then arises as to whether a more expansive and hospitable
framework for litigation, including class action legislation, would
be consistent with the existing institutional balance. Importation of
specific procedural tools on a piecemeal basis may upset settled
societal compromises concerning the role of regulation
and
67
litigation without offering a suitable, predictable alternative.
This is not to say that legal systems should not evolve to
address increasing industrial complexity, only that such
considerations must be made in context. In the same manner that
the United States has trimmed back access to the courts through
the Class Action Fairness Act, expanded access to the courts in
jurisdictions outside the United States may be in order. Indeed, we
may be witnessing a convergence, with the United States seeking
to limit access to courts and jurisdictions outside the United States
seeking to expand access. Such decisions have distinct
implications for maintaining the balance between regulation and
litigation, harmonizing disparate economic interests, and
maintaining predictability within the system.
Such theoretical considerations will play out against the
class action statute recently promulgated in Sweden, the current
proposals in France, and the broader discussions concerning the
efficacy of enacting an EU-wide class action statute. 68 These
developments will have significant implications for the ebb and
flow of litigation both nationally and internationally and will
stimulate a re-evaluation of the appropriate role of the legal system
in addressing social policy issues.
Starting from different endpoints in the spectrum, litigation
67 Reimann.
68
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versus direct regulation as means to adjust norms to society's
values, the two approaches seem to be converging in their
outcome.
III. Tobacco Control Policy and Litigation
In light of the differences between the legal system in the
United States and elsewhere and, conversely, the proposals relating
to class actions that may promote a convergence, the question
arises as to how tobacco control measures can be best managed
and implemented. The U.S. experience suggests that a strategy of
accommodation, where legitimate economic and societal interests
can be recognized and balanced is the path dictated by increasing
globalization, instantaneous communications, and the growing
power of consumer groups. Will the rough accommodation taking
hold in the United State be achieved internationally without
passing through similar phases
of litigation and the attendant
69
(mis)allocation of resources?
A parallel concern is whether the current arrangements and
identifiable trends in the United States constitute the contours of an
emerging "equilibrium" in the relations among government,
society, and industry or merely a lull in litigation activity. Soaring
health care costs will continue to exert pressure on health care
systems and spur government efforts toward cost containment. In
addition, changing consumption patterns in the population may
lead companies to adopt different business strategies that may or
may not collide with government priorities and related approaches
to corporate governance and social policy priorities. Such an
analysis, particularly as it relates to future scenarios and the
attainment of a stable equilibrium, is predicated on viewing
tobacco as a product that will continue to exist irrespective of
regulatory policy due to underlying demand. to do so using far less
69
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discretion than that exercised by U.S. counterparts. If one accepts
this proposition together with the view that notions of corporate
governance and behavior have evolved,7 ° then the focus should be
on achieving the new modus vivendi without imposing dead weight
costs on society. A balance of power must exist before a
meaningful compact can be reached. In this regard, Article 19 of
the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control sets a
71
useful benchmark:
Article 19 - Liability

1. For the purpose of tobacco control, the Parties
shall consider taking legislative action or promoting
their existing laws, where necessary, to deal with
criminal and, civil liability, including compensation
where appropriate.
2. Parties shall cooperate with each other in
exchanging information through the Conference of
the Parties in accordance with Article 21 including:
(a) information on the health effects of the
consumption of tobacco products and exposure
to tobacco smoke in accordance with Article
20.3(a); and
(b) information on legislation and regulations in
force as well as pertinent jurisprudence.
3. The Parties
shall, as appropriate
and
mutually agreed, within the
limits of national legislation, policies, legal
practices and
applicable existing treaty arrangements, afford one
another assistance in legal proceedings relating to
70

A brief look at the websites of the largest tobacco companies shows the industry's

intention to cooperate with governments, to help and take part in regulatory instruments,
and to disclose recent research and other relevant materials.
71World Health Org.. WHO Framework on Tobacco Control, supra note 55. at 17
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civil and criminal liability consistent with this
Convention.
4. The Convention shall in no way affect or limit
any rights of access of the parties to each other's
courts where such rights exist.
5. The Conference of the Parties may consider, if
possible, at an early stage, taking account of the
work being done in relevant international fora,
issues related to liability including appropriate
international approaches to these issues and
appropriate means to support, upon request, the
Parties in their legislative and other activities in
accordance with this Article.
The Convention manifests a broad societal concern,
together with a firm intent on the part of governments, to control
tobacco, using all appropriate legal means at a country's disposal.
Interestingly, the industry participated in the elaboration of the
Convention, exercising its option regarding notice and comment.
At the time its contributions were viewed with skepticism due to
the atmosphere of abiding mistrust arising from decades of
adversarial relations. The approach to these issues can be either
dictatorial or consensual, with the adoption of the latter relying on
a paradigm shift between the industry and its regulators.
Given the evolution of the litigation environment in the
United States, including the evolving consensus concerning the
industry's right to exist within certain confines and prevailing
views of corporate responsibility, the approach to tobacco control
on the international level should focus on finding the appropriate
space in which to reach an accommodation, provided that both
sides have sufficient economic incentives to do so.
This will require the industry to find an adequate
interlocutor and the parties to agree on certain basic principles
regarding the role of the product in society, including its
immediate externalities, the underlying demand for the product,
and the impossibility of immediately reallocating productive
capacity to other uses while maintaining employment and
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budgetary flexibility.
At the international level, there will be questions as to
whether "one size fits all" with regard to the appropriate scope and
content of a given accommodation. The Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, the move toward harmonization regarding both
product liability and product safety issues, and the notoriety of the
tobacco control issue may render some type of concerted action
possible. The European approach, which tends to favor regulation
and administration over litigation and case-specific outcomes, may
further provide an impetus toward a negotiated solution, whether it
takes the form of an international or EU-wide settlement or a set of
national settlements concluded pursuant to certain broad
international guidelines.
We believe governments will move assertively to contain
the negative effects of smoking by adopting forceful public health
strategies. Our analysis, however, suggests that such steps should
be informed on the international level by the litigation experience
in the United States. In an era of heightened, highly public
standards of corporate responsibility, when consensus can be
promoted by commercial compromise, judicial moderation, and
transparent regulatory action adapted to prevailing institutional
conditions, such an approach provides an opportunity to move
expeditiously to a realistic equilibrium at lower cost.
F. CONCLUSION
Tobacco litigation took root in the fertile ground of the U.S.
legal system, with individual claims against the companies being
used as an ad hoc tool for elaborating social policy. The social
norms and public health concerns at the time were, however,
permissive regarding smoking. Evidence about health and the
health cost impact of smoking has only been gathered over time
due to increasing societal awareness and parallel strides in
scientific and medical knowledge.
The repeated success of the tobacco companies in
individual cases lead to a new legal approach focusing on class
actions. As before, the focus was on the alleged misconduct of the
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tobacco companies, as buttressed by the production of
documentation through the use of the aforementioned "discovery"
procedure. Tobacco litigation then began to spread internationally,
with individual cases appearing in several countries. Thus, with a
lag of almost thirty years, other countries followed the United
States, albeit on a much smaller and restrained scale, with again a
substantial advantage for the tobacco companies in terms of
litigation success rates. The standard of proof required to
demonstrate the misconduct of the tobacco companies is hard to
meet, as it must distinguish between the individual decisions of
consumers regarding smoking, given the associated and
increasingly well-known health risks, and those perhaps unfairly
induced or "promoted" by the companies due to industry
misconduct.
As has been seen, a third wave began in the U.S. in the
1990s, based on four distinctive features: (i) reliance on politically
powerful third party payors in the form of the states or statesupported health care entities to bring the cases (ii) increased
knowledge of smoking and its health implications and related
industry (mis)conduct acquired through the enhanced access to
documentation during the second wave, (iii) increasing medical
costs on a system-wide basis, and (iv) an alleged causal
relationship between smoking and health care costs. The evidence
produced matched an interest on the part of the U.S. states to
recoup medical treatment costs associated with tobacco
consumption.
The move to focus on aspects more amenable to
measurement (e.g., the health implications and quantified costs of
smoking), the sheer size of the claims involved, and the political
power of the plaintiffs changed the risks of litigation for the
companies, despite their previous record of courtroom success.
This modified litigation landscape and changed risk calculus
prompted the search for an agreement that essentially had the
nature of an "insurance contract" - against a stream of payments
effected over a period of 25 years, no more legal cases of a similar
nature would be brought by the states. Basically, the cost of prior
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litigation and the possibility of even more costly future litigation
lead the parties to establish a sort of regulatory compact for the
tobacco industry derived directly from the litigation process.
For the international scene, one may wonder whether the
same route and a similar endpoint will be reached. In our view, the
development of a formal and increasingly strict regulatory
equilibrium will emerge, without recourse to the intensive
litigation that characterized the U.S. process.
This is due to two main reasons: (1) Tobacco companies
are globalized and their resulting openness to a transparent,
consensual regulatory modus vivendi is therefore likely to develop
in overseas jurisdictions faster than was the case in the United
States. Indeed, the public smoking bans implemented across
Europe without the intensive lobbying efforts to counter such
measures that had characterized industry strategy and conduct in
the past are an indication of the new ethos; and (2) The legal
traditions and systemic frameworks of many jurisdictions outside
the U.S. are not heavily reliant on case-specific decisions for
effecting social change but rather on the elaboration and
implementation of regulatory, administrative, and legislative
norms. Moreover, the difficulties in proving in an adjudicative
forum the alleged misconduct of the tobacco companies and the
effect thereof on consumer behavior discourage the use of the
courts. Such difficulties are further compounded by the general
lack, or at least limited availability in non-US jurisdictions, of
procedural devices, such as the aforementioned "discovery"
technique for gaining access to and assembling company
information. Lower damages amounts in most non-U.S.
jurisdictions provide a further disincentive for resorting to fullblown, "scorched- earth" litigation.
For all of the above reasons, stemming from the history of
the extensive litigation in the U.S. and the related legal and
economic lessons learned, to the globalized nature of the product
and resulting societal perceptions, to the regulatory emphasis in
most jurisdictions outside the U.S., and the common interest of
government regulators and companies in managing the product in a
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socially efficient and potentially "Pareto-optimal" manner, it
appears that the U.S. litigation experience is unlikely to be
replicated abroad. Moreover, it is likely that the consensual,
somewhat less confrontational, approach is likely to be a harbinger
of the future on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly where issues
of broad social policy are at stake, whether in the tobacco sector or
in other industries of social concern.
To conclude, it is worth returning to our initial questions:
How can the U.S. experience in tobacco litigation serve as a guide
at the international level? And has it served the broader public
interest?
In the United States, litigation was deemed to be an
important supplement to an already highly regulated tobacco
sector, regardless of the attendant costs. The tradition of private
attorneys general, whereby individuals are expected, if not
encouraged, to vindicate their rights through litigation, provided a
favorable backdrop for the proliferation of court cases in the U.S.
context.
European countries start from a different point, with a
highly developed regulatory culture, different legal traditions, and
less overall reliance on litigation to address issues of broad social
policy. It is therefore difficult to see how the same road can be
followed, and in light of what appears to be the endpoint, whether,
indeed, it should be.
In the United States, the final balance has now been
broadly defined at both the state and federal level with the
conclusion of the MSA, and the recently decided federal
racketeering (RICO) case, with individual litigation being
relegated to a smaller and declining role. The rough equilibrium to
which the United States has gravitated over the years appears to be
already well advanced in Europe through the direct regulatory
path. Rapidly industrializing and developing economies in Asia
and elsewhere also appear to be moving expeditiously to plug
regulatory gaps through the passage of tobacco control legislation
inspired by both the European model and international instruments,
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such as the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
even as sporadic litigation activity has manifested itself.
Thus, the final outcome reached in the United States is
likely to be also reached internationally, most likely by a heavy
reliance on direct, transparent regulation, thereby saving the time
and costs of the litigation path.
On the second question regarding the public interest, it is
clear that the tobacco cases raised the awareness of citizens in the
U.S. concerning the health risks though the extent of the 'market
failure' concerning (a) the ability of consumers to assess accurately
the relevant risk and (b) the related efficiency of using litigation to
remedy this alleged information gap, particularly in terms of cost
and transparency are suspect. Ultimately, firms changed their
behavior in order to find a new 'business space' adapted to
prevailing social perceptions and circumstances that would allow
them to function as legitimate commercial actors without having to
engage in constant, high cost litigation. Government responded to
secure enhanced enforcement and control over the product together
with a predictable revenue stream derived therefrom. Globalization
and enhanced communication will no doubt promote similar
cooperation strategies on the part of the industry and governments
elsewhere. Having experienced a somewhat coerced change from
old business ways to the ones available under (and compatible
with) the MSA in the United States, firms are likely to move
rapidly in a conciliatory direction.
From the European and perhaps the broader international
perspective, it would therefore appear that moving to a sustainable
commercial and societal equilibrium through transparent regulation
and openly negotiated compromises, as opposed to litigation,
might offer the lowest cost and most efficient alternative for both
safeguarding the public interest, as defined at the outset of this
article, and managing what most agree is a controversial, but wellensconced, product sector.
For many, the tobacco industry is anachronistic, at best, and
wholly unacceptable, at worst. Oscillating between these two
poles, the tobacco industry may actually become a template for
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other industries in the development of consensual rulemaking
practices designed to enhance government control, enforcement,
and revenues while providing the commercial stakeholders room to
carry out their business. Given the growing complexity of the
world economy and the development of new industries and
companies of ever increasing global reach, it appears likely that
some form of direct regulatory approach, balancing the interests of
the concerned stakeholders, will become common place to secure
the efficiencies that are lost in piecemeal litigation. Microsoft's
attempt to accommodate the European Union in the antitrust
sphere, albeit after a protracted legal battle, is, in some respects, a
variation on the tobacco theme outlined in this paper. It is easy to
imagine that such an approach predicated on direct discussions
aimed at accommodating the interests of the concerned
stakeholders will become the norm as the implications of certain
forms of commercial activity for areas of broad, yet pressing,
social concern, such as the environment or privacy, become
evident. The matrix of government, individual, and commercial
interests at issue will require a more global, synthetic, and
collaborative approach to regulation in order to ensure both
reasonable and appropriate control for government and sufficient
commercial freedom and initiative for industry to promote
movement toward an appropriate and sustainable societal
equilibrium.

